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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
United States v.Ortiz, 422US. 891 (1975)
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US. 873
(1975)
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)
Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975)
The Supreme Court decided four fourth amend-
ment cases this past term dealing with stops and
searches by immigration authorities near, but not
directly at, the United States border. Continuing an
approach taken two years earlier in 1973,' the
Court's decisions in United States v. Ortiz' and
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce' restricted the dis-
cretion of the Border Patrol to stop and search
vehicles for illegal aliens by requiring the standard of
probable cause for immigration searches at fixed
checkpoints, and the standard of at least "reasonable
suspicion" of immigration violations for routine
Border Patrol "stops" of vehicles to inquire about
citizenship and immigration status. In United States
v. Peltier' and Bowen v. United States, 'however, the
Court refused to give retroactive application to these
stricter standards for border area stops and searches.
The significance of the latter two decisions may go
well beyond the retroactivity question, for, in his
dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
expressed considerable apprehension that the reason-
ing of the Court cast serious doubt on the future of
the exclusionary rule as a means to enforce fourth
amendment rights.
STRICTER STANDARDS FOR BORDER SEARCHES
The stops and searches in the cases noted herein
all were conducted by the Border Patrol under the
authority of section 287 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.' Under this section, agents of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service have the
power, without warrant, "to interrogate any alien or
person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or
'Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973). The Court held that except at the border, or its
functional equivalents, roving patrols could not search
vehicles without a warrant or probable cause.
'422 U.S. 891 (1975).
'422 U.S. 873 (1975).
'422 U.S. 531 (1975).
"422 U.S. 916 (1975).
'Immigration & Nationality Act § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357
(1970).
to remain in the United States." 7 They may also,
without warrant, "within a reasonable distance from
any external boundary of the United States .. .
board and search for aliens any vessel within the
territorial waters of the United States and any
railway car, conveyance or vehicle ... ."8 "Rea-
sonable distance" is defined as within 100 air miles
of the border.'
Pursuant to this statutory authority the Border
Patrol maintains both fixed checkpoints and roving
patrols throughout the Southwest border area. The
purpose of the checkpoints is to give border patrol
officials a chance to observe traffic passing through
the area. If an officer suspects that a vehicle may be
carrying illegal aliens, he may stop it to inquire
about the citizenship of the driver and passengers. If
his suspicion is not abated, the officer may conduct a
search of the car to determine if illegal aliens are
hidden somewhere inside. " To more thoroughly
canvass the border area for illegal aliens, the Border
Patrol also operates roving patrols which stop and
search vehicles throughout the region.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 11 the circuit courts in the
southwest border area usually upheld these immigra-
tion stops and searches if "a founded suspicion""
existed for the belief that a particular vehicle was
7Id. § 135 7 (a)(1).
'Id. § 1357(a)(3).
'8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1975). The Attorney General
promulgates these regulations.
10422 U.S. at 894. Agents normally check in the trunk,
under or behind seats, and even under the hood or flooring,
Id. at 894 n.1.
11413 U.S. 266 (1973). See note 1 supra.
"The phrase comes from Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d
412 (9th Cir. 1966). "A founded suspicion is all that is
necessary, some basis from which the court can determine
that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing." Id. at
415 (emphasis added). The case did not involve a border
search, but the Ninth Circuit frequently cites the language
of the decision in its border area search cases. The Fifth
Circuit used the phrase "reasonable suspicion." United
States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973). The Tenth Circuit upheld
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involved in violating the immigration laws.'" But,
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits sometimes upheld the
actions of the Border Patrol even when no "founded
suspicion" existed for a stop or search. ", Apparently
even the circuit court judges themselves disagree on
what standards their decisions actually required."I
The Border Patrol's right to search vehicles on less
than the traditional fourth amendment standard of
probable cause was challenged in Almeida-Sanchez.
Before the Supreme Court, the Government argued
that immigration searches did not require probable
cause to be constitutional. In support of its argument
the Government cited cases approving automobile
searches without warrants, "' administrative searches
without probable cause, "7 and the language of section
287 which specifically exempts the warrant require-
ment and makes no mention of probable cause. "The
Court rejected all three arguments, noting that
automobile searches still require probable cause; 19
that administrative searches require a general ad-
ministrative warrant in the absence of consent; 20
and that since "no Act of Congress can authorize a
violation of the Constitution" 2' section 287 must be
construed to allow warrantless searches by roving
patrols only on a showing of probable cause."
stops and searches if they were "within a reasonable
distance" (100 miles) of the Mexican border. United States
v. Anderson, 468 F.2d 1280, 1282 (10th Cir. 1972).
"United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974); United States v.
McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 921 (1973).
"Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.
1970); Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206
(10th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit apparently always
required at least "reasonable suspicion." Peltier, 422 U.S.
at 546 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Bowen v. United
States, 422 U.S. at 919 n.1. "There was some ground for
confusion about the state of the law in the Fifth Circuit at
the time Almeida-Sanchez was decided."
"United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 968, 978, 981,
982 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United
States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).6Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
"'Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).





"Only searches within the United States are affected.
The right to search at the border itself, or at its functional
equivalents continues to be maintained without any re-
quirement of warrant or probable cause. Id. at 272-73.
The Government's policy argument was also
rejected:
It is not enough to argue . . . that the problem of
deterring unlawful entry by aliens across long ex-
panses of national boundaries is a serious one. The
needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension
with the Constitution's protections of the individual
against certain exercises of official power. It is pre-
cisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels
a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards. 2
The Court's decision this past term in United
States v. Ortiz2" picks up where Almeida-Sanchez
left off two years ago. The factual context in Ortiz
involved three illegal aliens who were found hidden
in the trunk of Ortiz's car during a search conducted
by the Border Patrol at a fixed checkpoint near San
Clemente, California. Ortiz was later convicted of
transporting illegal aliens." He appealed and the
Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on its earlier decision
in Bowen v. United States' that the requirement of
probable cause for roving patrols outlined in Al-
meida-Sanchez also extends to searches at fixed
checkpoints.
In its argument before the Supreme Court, the
Government maintained that fixed checkpoint
searches were less intrusive than roving patrol
searches and that the Border Patrol officials stationed
at such checkpoints had less discretion in choosing
which cars to search. " Therefore, the Government
contended, searches at fixed checkpoints fell within
the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonable-
ness even though conducted without probable cause.
The Court, however, found that the Border Patrol
officials at fixed checkpoints in fact exercised consid-
erable discretion in deciding which cars to stop. 2" It
also rejected the argument that the searches were
significantly less intrusive. 29 Speaking for the
Court, Justice Powell said:
A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial
invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from
official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded
probable cause as the minimum requirement for a
2"Id. at 273.
2"422 U.S. 891 (1975).
258 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1970) makes it unlawful to
knowingly transport illegal immigrants.
26500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916
(1975).
27422 U.S. at 894.
2Fewer than 3 per cent of the vehicles passing
through fixed checkpoints in 1974 were searched. Id. at
896.
'2Since so few cars are singled out, the Court felt
motorists might find the searches especially offensive. Id. at
895.
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lawful search. We are not persuaded that the differ-
ences between roving patrols and traffic checkpoints
justify dispensing in this case with the safeguards we
required in Almeida-Sanchez. "
Thus, probable cause is now required before a
vehicle search for illegal aliens may be conducted."'
The Court was unwilling to extend the strict
standard of probable cause used for searches to
routine vehicle stops by roving border patrols. In
United States o. Brignoni-Ponce, 3 2 Border Patrol
agents stopped the defendant's car just north of the
then closed San Clemente checkpoint. During the
brief questioning the agents discovered that two of
the passengers were illegally in the country, and
Brignoni-Ponce was charged with transporting ille-
gal aliens.3" Since the patrol stopped the car solely
"because the occupants appeared to be of Mexican
descent," Brignoni-Ponce moved at trial to suppress
the testimony of the aliens as the fruit of an illegal
seizure. 3' The trial court denied his motion. His
conviction was appealed 3 ' and considered by the
Ninth Circuit in light of the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Almeida-Sanchez and the circuit court's
decisions in Peltier3" and Bowen. "
The court first examined the nature of the stop.
Because the patrol that stopped Brignoni-Ponce had
been parked on the exit side of the San Clemente
checkpoint observing the traffic after it passed
through the checkpoint area, the court reasoned that
the stop more closely resembled a roving patrol stop
than one at a fixed checkpoint." This determination
was important since the court had decided earlier in
Peltier and Bowen that only in cases involving
searches by roving patrols would the probable cause
requirement of Almeida-Sanchez be applied retro-
actively. '9
Having thus disposed of the retroactivity question,
30 Id. at 896.
3SThe Court listed a number of factors to be considered
in determining the existence of probable cause: number of
persons in the car, behavior of the occupants, ability of the
occupants to speak English, nature of the vehicle, and
indications that the car is heavily loaded. Id. at 897. The
Court did not give extra weight to any of the factors nor
attempt to identify which one or combination would provide
a sufficient basis for probable cause.
32 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
338 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1970).
3"422 U.S. at 875.
35499 F.2d 1109 (1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
36500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 531
(1975).
37500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916
(1975).
38499 F.2d at 1110.
391d.
the court next considered the constitutional question
of whether probable cause should be required for
roving patrol stops as well as for searches. It noted
that the Tenth Circuit had earlier held that the
probable cause requirement applies only to searches,
not to stops. " But the Ninth Circuit was not
persuaded:
We cannot adopt the approach taken by our brothers
on the Tenth Circuit. . . .Under the Tenth Circuit's
view, immigration officals could stop a vehicle any-
where in the country in order to interrogate its
occupants as to their right to be in the United States,
without warrant, without probable cause, and without
even a reasonable suspicion that any of the occupants
are illegal aliens."
Such stops, the court felt, would be inconsistent with
the reasoning in Almeida-Sanchez. The court further
noted that the word "stop" had been used in
conjunction with the word "search" in Almeida-
Sanchez, and that the Supreme Court qdioted exten-
sively from Carroll v. United States"2 on the public's
right to "free passage" on the highways, free of stops
and searches unless officials have probable cause to
believe that a vehicle is engaged in illegal activity. "'
The actual holding of the Ninth Circuit, however,
was stated in terms of "founded suspicion" rather
than "probable cause." Declaring it to be the "law of
the circuit" that stops be accompanied by a "founded
suspicion,"' the court then held that Mexican
ancestry alone did not amount to such "founded
suspicion."' 5 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
Government challenged only the "founded suspi-
cion" requirement.46
The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court's
decision that the stop was more like a roving patrol
stop than one at a fixed checkpoint. It also considered
"United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir.
1973).
"1499 F.2d at 1110-11.
"2267 U.S. 132 (1925).
43499 F.2d at 1111.
44Id. at 1112. The circuit court had used this phrase in
previous cases: United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d
853, 854 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136
(1974); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th
Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283
(9th Cir. 1970), upholding a stop at a fixed checkpoint with
no mention of the suspicion requirement.
"The court had earlier dealt with the question of
ancestry as a basis for suspicion in United States v.
Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973). "[Clonduct does no
become suspicious because the skins of the occupants [of a
vehicle] are nonwhite." Id. at 861.
"The Government did not question the retroactive
application of Almeida-Sanchez in this case. 422 U.S. at
876.
[Vol. 66
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such stops to be "seizures" under the fourth
amendment' but felt that the intrusion was
"minimal." 4 8 In addition, it pointed out the valid
public interest in checking the entry of illegal ali-
ens."' The problem was one of finding the proper
balance "between the public interest and the individ-
ual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers."" 8 Using basically the
reasoning of Terry v. Ohio" and Adams v.
Williams5 2 the Court in Brignoni-Ponce decided that
border area stops are permissible on less than
probable cause because of the difficulty of maintain-
ing sufficient control at the border itself, the serious-
ness of the illegal alien problem,"3 and the minimally
intrusive nature of the stop. But, there must be a
"reasonable suspicion" based on the "officer's obser-
vations" that a particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens before any vehicle may be detained. "'
The effect of this decision, in Justice Powell's
words,
is to limit exercise of the authority granted by both
§ 287(a)(1) and § 287(a)(3). Except at the border and
its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may
stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articu-
lable facts, together with rational inferences from those
facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that'the vehi-
cles contain aliens who may be illegally in the coun-
try. 88
The stop must be brief and limited in scope. Any
search or significant detention "must be based on
consent" or meet the higher standard of probable
cause. 86
The individual officer is allowed to "assess the
facts in light of his experience detecting illegal entry
and smuggling."8 5 Since the officer in Brignoni-
Ponce justified the stop of the vehicle solely on the
basis of the apparent Mexican ancestry of its passen-
gers, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that
there was no "reasonable suspiion" for the stop.
However, the Court conceded that a "Mexican
appearance might be a relevant factor to be
considered." 8
There were no dissents in either Ortiz or Brig-
4
'
7 1d. at 878.
48 Id. at 880.
"'Id. at 879.
88 1d. at 878.
51392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52407 U.S. 143 (1972).
"
3See 422 U.S. at 900 app. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
1'422 U.S. at 881.
"I1d. at 884 (footnote omitted).
61ad. at 882.
5
7Id. at 885.8Id. at 887.
noni-Ponce, although three Justices in Ortiz and four
in Brignoni-Ponce concurred begrudgingly in the
results only, and Justice Rehnquist, while joining
with the opinion of the Court in both cases, pointed
out that, in his opinion, neither decision cast any
doubt on the constitutionality of routine immigration
stops at fixed checkpoints,58 port of entry border
searches, agricultural inspections, highway road-
blocks or similar stops, "whether or not accompanied
by 'reasonable suspicion."' go
Chief Justice Burger, with Justice Blackmun
joining his concurring opinion, felt the Court's
decisions would seriously impair the effectiveness of
the Immigration Service in dealing with the illegal
alien problem .61 He expressed the hope that the
Court would reconsider its position in future cases,
feeling that otherwise
history may view us as prisoners of our own traditional
and appropriate concern for individual rights, un-
able-or unwilling-to apply the concept of reason-
ableness explicit in the Fourth Amendment in order to
develop a rational accommodation between those
rights and the literal safety of the country. 82
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, agreed
with the Chief Justice that the effect of the decisions
would be to severely hamper the work of the
Immigration Service. However, he observed that the
system had been "notably unsuccessful" anyway,
and that "perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to
accommodate the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment to the needs of a system which at best
can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness .... "163
Congress and. the executive branch should be deal-
ing with the policy issues involved. He suggested in
particular that Congress consider making it unlawful
to employ illegal aliens.
Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court in
Ortiz, but only the result in Brlgnoni-Ponce. He felt
the standard of reasonable suspicion promulgated in
Brignoni-Ponce was not stringent enough, but had
"brought a state of affairs where police may stop
citizens on the highway on the flimsiest of
justifications." 6' He was particularly distressed that
69422 U.S. at 898 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Stops at
fixed checkpoints are not covered by any of the Supreme
Court's decisions.
"Id. at 899; U.S. at 422 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
61He stressed his concern by appending an exerpt from
United States v. Baca, 368 F.Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973),
which detailed the complexities of the illegal alien problem.
422 U.S. at 900 app. (Burger, C. J., concurring).





the Court made no attempt to identify what combina-
tion of factors would actually meet its test of
reasonable suspicion.
While the Court's opinions in Almeida-Sanchez
and Ortiz make it clear that probable cause to search
is necessary for both roving patrols and officials at
fixed checkpoints, the strong dissents in Almeida-
Sanchez and the reluctant concurring opinions in
Ortiz indicate that the issue is far from closed.
Furthermore, the Court specifically left open the
question of the constitutionality of an area-wide
search warrant system suggested by Justice Powell in
Almeida-Sanchez. " In addition, the Court has spe-
cifically exempted searches at the "functional equiva-
lents" of the border from the probable cause
requirement. 6" Yet, it has made no attempt to
carefully define what it means by that phrase and the
courts of appeals seem to be developing varying
interpretations."e Until these issues come directly
before the Court, it is difficult to predict the
long-range significance of the probable cause re-
quirement of Almeida-Sanchez and Ortiz.
The decision to allow stops on less than probable
cause creates additional uncertainty in this area. In
Almeida-Sanchez and Ortiz the seriousness of the
illegal alien problem was not sufficient to overcome
the "Constitution's protections of the individual." 68
On the other hand, in Brignoni-Ponce, reasonable
as413 U.S. at 275-85. Justice Powell, in his concurring
opinion, suggested that some type of area wide warrant
system similar to that used in administrative searches might
provide a more workable balance between the rights of
citizens and the mandate of the Border Patrol to police
border areas against the entry of illegal aliens. He felt area
warrants could be issued for "reasonable period [s] of time,"
based on the general likelihood of current illegal activity in
the area, rather than a more stringent standard of probable
cause that a particular vehicle was involved in violations of
the immigration laws. Such a system, he maintained, has
the advantage of requiring the Border Patrol to "obtain
advance judicial approval of the decision to conduct roving
searches on a particular road or roads," yet it would not
"frustrate" the government's purpose in conducting the
searches. Id. at 283.
66422 U.S. at 896-97; 413 U.S. at 272.
67 In Almeida-Sanchez, Justice Stewart gave two exam-
ples to illustrate the phrase: "an established station near the
border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more
roads that extend from the border," and international
airports. 413 U.S. at 273. The Ninth Circuit has defined it
as a "place ... where virtually everyone searched has just
come from . . . the border." United States v. Bowen, 500
F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974). But, the Fifth Circuit has
upheld searches at fixed checkpoints as far as seventy-five
miles from the border as "functional equivalents" of a
border search. United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th
Cir. 1975).
66413 U.S. at 273.
suspicion, not the traditional constitutional protec-
tion of probable cause, was considered acceptable
because the "public interest demands effective mea-
sures to control the illegal entry of aliens at the
Mexican Border." 
6 9
It is probably true, as the Court maintains, that a
stop is less intrusive than a search. 70 It is also true
that the standard of reasonable suspicion, based on
"articulable facts" offers more protection to citizens
than the unlimited discretion the government urged
the Court to allow Border Patrol officials. But as
Justice Douglas points out, 71 the Court has failed to
sufficiently articulate the standard of reasonable
suspicion it now requires. Will the fact that a
Mexican-American drives along a southwestern
highway close to the border in a stationwagon
"riding low" and with a "spare tire in the back
seat"" 2 be enough to arouse a reasonable suspicion
that he is violating immigration laws? Would the
suspicion be warranted if the driver were not
Mexican-American? Justice Jackson phrased it well
in his dissent in Brinegar v. United States: "[T]he
extent of any privilege of search and seizure without
warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and
apply themselves and will push to the limit." 
7 3
Although Justice Jackson was specifically referring to
the probable cause requirement in Brinegar, it is
hard to see how the situation will be different in the
context of immigration stops made on the basis of
"reasonable suspicion."
Controlling the entry of illegal aliens is clearly a
problem of some magnitude. One system of dealing
with it has now been curtailed by the Court. But that
does not mean that other workable, perhaps better,
solutions cannot be developed. " Habit and official
69422 U.S. at 878.
7 Id. at 880. The stop usually takes less than a minute
according to the government, and only requires an answer
to one or two questions and, perhaps, the production of
immigration papers.
7 Id. at 890.
2Both factors have been considered evidence of reasona-
ble suspicion in circuit court decisions. United States v.
Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1136 (1974) (riding low); United States v.
Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1973) (spare tire in the
back seat).
73338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).7
'The area warrant system has yet to be tested. Justices
White and Blackmun and the Chief Justice have also
suggested making it unlawful to hire illegal aliens. 422
U.S. at 900 (Burger, C. J., & Blackmun, J., concurring);
422 U.S. at 915 (White & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
See also Professor Amsterdam's suggestion for the devel-
opment of police-made rules for searches and seizures.
[Vol. 66
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expediency should not take precedence over constitu-
tional rights. As Professor Amsterdam once noted:
[T]he history of the destruction of liberty... has
largely been the history of the relaxation of those
[procedural] safeguards in the face of plausible sound-
ing governmental claims of a need to deal with widely
frightening and emotion-freighted threats to the good
order of society. 11
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
When constitutional standards change, courts are
faced with the problem of whether to apply the new
standards retroactively or prospectively. 7 If the new
standards reflect a "sharp break" 7 with past prece-
dent the courts frequently give them merely prospec-
tive effect. 7' A "sharp break" with precedent is not
the only factor considered, however. Since 1965 the
Supreme Court has attempted to develop specific
criteria to aid in the determination of whether a new
rule should be applied prospectively or
retroactively. " In Linkletter v. Walker"0 the Court
said retroactivity must be determined on a case by
case basis by "looking to the prior history of the
rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its op-
eration." 8' In Stovall v. Denno 82 the Linkletter ap-
proach was further refined into a three pronged
test which focuses on: (1) the purpose the new rule
is to serve; (2) the extent government officials
have relied on previous standards; and (3) the ef-
fect retroactive application will have on the admin-
istration of justice. "
Under this test the Court tends to give primary
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349,410-40 (1974).7 5Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 354.76For purposes of this note the term prospective includes
retroactive application in the case in which the new
principle is first announced.77Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381 n.2 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart suggested that to
be nonretroactive a decision must overrule clear past
precedent or alter a long established practice that has been
generally relied upon. Id. at 381-82 n.2. Other decisions
have spoken in terms of "a clear break with the past,"
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969), or "an
avulsive change" in the law, Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 499 (1968).
78See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
7
"Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
8 0 1d.
"Id. at 629.
82388 U.S. 293 (1967).
83Id. at 297.
consideration to the purpose of the new rule. "' If the
purpose is to correct "an aspect of the criminal trial
that substantially impairs its truth-finding func-
tion," "the Court favors retroactive application of the
new standard. 86 If, on the other hand, the new rule
will not avert a "clear danger of convicting the
innocent," 87 the Court seldom applies it
retroactively. 88
After analyzing the purpose, the Court considers
the factors of reliance and the effect on the adminis-
tration of justice. In most cases, if officials have acted
in "good faith," believing that their conduct was ac-
ceptable under previous constitutional standards, the
Court is unlikely to apply its new standards retro-
actively. 89 This is particularly true if application of
the new standards would result in large numbers of
new trials for defendants convicted under the old
standards. " But, neither extensive reliance nor a
disruptive effect on the administration of justice will
prevent a new rule from being applied retroactively
if the Court determines that it affects the vital "truth-
finding" function of the trial. 9,
In fourth amendment cases, the Court's consider-
ation of the purpose of new exclusionary rule
standards has consistently led to a denial of
retroactivity. " The Court's purpose in extending the
exclusionary rule in most cases is to deter unlawful
police conduct. " But, once a search has taken place,
the Court has concluded, there is no deterrent value
84 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
8 5Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
"
8See, e.g., Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5
(1968) (right to counsel at arraignment and preliminary
hearing); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (require-
ment that every effort be made to have witnesses present at
trial before transcript of preliminary hearing testimony may
be substituted for the physical presence of the witnesses).8 7Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
8 See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973);
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
8 8DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
9GDesist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). The
number of potential retrials may not be a significant
consideration if the Court feels prospectivity is clearly
indicated for other reasons. Id. at 252.
9 Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
92See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646
(1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969);
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968).
8 3Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court has
also spoken of the "imperative of judicial integrity" in its
exclusionary rule decisions, Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 222 (1960), but some scholars have maintained
that this is mere rhetoric and that the control of unlawful
police conduct is the major purpose of the rule. Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. CH. L. REV. 665, 669-71 (1970).
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to be gained by applying the new standards
retroactively. 94 Furthermore, because the reliability
of evidence taken in an illegal search is seldom
questioned," new applications of the exclusionary
rule rarely have any effect on the "truth-finding"
function of a criminal trial. Thus, one major justifi-
cation for the retroactive application of a new
constitutional standard is absent in exclusionary rule
cases.
The Court's examination of the factors of reliance
and the effect on the administration of justice have
also pointed to prospective application of new exclu-
sionary rule standards. The Court has usually
approved official conduct exercised in reliance on
previous standards, maintaining that its own "peri-
odic restatements" of fourth amendment tests "fully
justified reliance on their continuing validity" 9 6
-even when some change in the standards was
"foreshadowed" in previous cases. 9 ' In addition,
since the guilt of the defendant is often apparent in
cases involving the suppression of evidence because
of official misconduct, " the Court has been particu-
larly unwilling to give retroactive effect to new ex-
clusionary rule standards which would inevitably
entail new trials for considerable numbers of de-
fendants whose convictions were validly obtained
under the old standards.
Given this history of reluctance to apply new
fourth amendment standards retroactively, the
Court's decisions in United States v. Peltier9 and
Bowen v. United States'...are not surprising. In both
cases the Court refused to give retroactive effect to the
probable cause standard announced earlier in Al-
meida-Sanchez-a decision which would have in-
validated the defendants' convictions because the
evidence used against them was admittedly obtained
in searches conducted without probable cause.
9 4Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). "The
misconduct of the police. . . has already occurred and will
not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved."
911d. at 638. "[There is no likelihood of unreliability
... present in a search-and-seizure case."
"'Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 250-51
(1969).0
'Id. at 248. In spite of the fact that the Court admitted
that its decision to subject electronic surveillance to tradi-
tional fourth amendment standards (Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967)) had been "foreshadowed" in earlier
decisions, the Court refused to give that decision retroactive
effect as it was still "a clear break with the past."
"In Peltier, after the motion to suppress was denied, the
defendant stipulated that he had in fact "knowingly
possessed" the marihuana found in his car. 422 U.S. at
531.
99422 U.S. 531 (1975).
100422 U.S. 916 (1975).
In Peltier the defendant's car was stopped by a
roving patrol for a routine immigration search, and
270 pounds of marihuana were found in his trunk.
The Government conceded that the search had been
conducted without warrant and had not been sup-
ported by probable cause. 'oThe defendant's motion
to suppress was denied on the basis that prior
decisions allowed border officials to search under
these circumstances.
The Ninth Circuit reversed'" Peltier's conviction
after concluding that Almeida-Sanchez should be
applied retroactively to roving patrol searches admit-
tedly illegal under the Almeida-Sanchez standards.
The majority maintained that the Almeida-Sanchez
decision made no "sharp break" with the Supreme
Court's previously espoused fourth amendment
standards, "' but rather continued the approach first
enunciated in Carroll v. United States. " Nor did
Almeida-Sanchez disrupt long accepted and relied
upon practices within the circuits. 5' While conced-
ing that dicta in previous cases might imply other-
wise, the court felt that all of its pre-Almeida-
Sanchez decisions were based on the standard of
probable cause or reasonable certainty. 106 Thus, the
majority of the court concluded, no question of "new
law" was presented and an analysis based on the
criteria of Stovall was unnecessary. Peltier was
entitled to the benefit of the rule announced in
Almeida-Sanchez, not because of retroactivity but
because of fourth amendment principles never deviated
from by the Supreme Court. "o
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision
reversed the Ninth Circuit.Justice Rehnquist, speak-
ing for the Court, first reviewed past dispositions of
"'
1Peltier, 422 U.S. at 533.0
°
2 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 531
(1975).
1 °0 d. at 988.
104267 U.S. 132 (1925).
"'Peltier, 500 F.2d at 988. The "sharp break" and
"disruption of long established practice" criteria were
suggested by Justice Stewart in Milton v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371, 381-82 n.2 (1972), as preconditions to retroactiv-
ity analysis. See note 77 supra.
106500 F.2d at 988. The court's review of prior
decisions included reference to United States v. Miranda,
426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970), in which the court upheld an
immigration stop and search without probable cause or
warrant. The case was dismissed as a singular exception.
1O1500 F.2d at 989. There were six dissenters who were
not convinced that Justice Stewart's approach, supra note
105, to the retroactivity question was the proper one to be
applied in this case. But, even if it were the appropriate test,
they disagreed that it justified retroactive application of the
rule of Almeida-Sanchez. They felt Almeida-Sanchez
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the retroactivity problem in cases involving the
exclusionary rule:
It is indisputable that in every case in which the
Court has addressed the retroactivity problem in the
context of the exclusionary rule, whereby concededly
relevant evidence is excluded in order to enforce a
constitutional guarantee that does not relate to the
integrity of the fact-finding process, the Court has
concluded that any such new constitutional principle
would be accorded only prospective application. 1'
The denial of retroactivity in exclusionary rule
cases, he observed, explained a great deal about both
the exclusionary rule and retroactivity analysis. 109
The history of the exclusionary rule cases showed
that the rule is meant to serve as a deterrent to
unlawful police conduct and as a means of preserving
the "imperative of judicial integrity." " 0 The "teach-
ing" of the retroactivity cases, however, was that
neither purpose is normally served by retroactive
application of new exclusionary rule standards." 1
The decision in Peltier, therefore, depended on
whether the factors of deterrence and judicial integ-
rity were of sufficient importance to require that the
evidence seized by the Border Patrol be
suppressed. "1'
Stressing that the Border Patrol had conducted the
search "in reliance upon a validly enacted statute,
supported by longstanding administrative regula-
tions and continuous judicial approval," "1 the ma-
jority of the Court maintained that the Border
Patrol's conduct had conformed to the "prevail-
ing ... constitutional norm"'" at the time of the
search. Although those constitutional standards were
overruled in Almeida-Sanchez, the Court concluded
that, given the purpose of the exclusionary rule and
the history of the circuit court decisions in border
area search cases,
nothing in the Fourth Amendment, or in the exclu-
sionary rule fashioned to implement it requires that
the evidence... be suppressed, even if... [the] re-
spondent's fourth amendment rights were violated by
the search of his car. Is
clearly disrupted a practice "widely relied upon" in the
circuit and established a new rule which had not previ-
ously been "foreshadowed." Id. at 990-93.
108422 U.S. at 535 (footnote omitted).
10 91d. at 536.
11
0 1d.
11 11d. at 537.




In Bowen v. United States" 6 the defendant's
camper was stopped for a routine immigration search
at a fixed checkpoint. Upon opening the camper
doors the Border Patrol officers smelled marihuana,
and a search of the vehicle uncovered 356 pounds of
the plant. While probable cause to search for
marihuana existed once the odor was detected, I" the
initial stop and request to search for aliens were
made without any evidence of probable cause.
The Ninth Circuit held that the rule in Almeida-
Sanchez for searches conducted by roving patrols
should also be applied to searches at fixed
checkpoints." 8 But, it refused to reverse Bowen's
conviction because the search of his car took place
before the decision in Almeida-Sanchez was handed
down. 1
The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit
on the retroactivity issue. 120 The same reasons that
led to the decision not to give Almeida-Sanchez
retroactive effect in Peltier applied equally well to
Bowen's case:
[Tihe Border Patrol reasonably relied on the deci-
sions of the courts of appeals in performing the search
in this case and others like it and in these circum-
stances the purpose of the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule would not be served by applying the
principle of Almeida-Sanchez retroactively. 121
In a dissenting opinion to both Peltier and Bowen,
Justice Brennan strongly protested the Court's
decisions. 122 In the first part of his dissent, Justice
11 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
1171d. at 919 n.1.
111500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916
(1975).
"'There were six dissenting judges. Four concurred
with the majority insofar as the decision generally denied
retroactive effect to the rule in Almeida-Sanchez. But they
dissented from that part of the holding which denied Bowen
himself the benefit of the court's extension of the probable
cause requirements to searches at fixed checkpoints. Id. at
981-84. Two other judges dissented from the retroactivity
ruling altogether, feeling that only decisions of the Supreme
Court itself should be considered in deciding whether the
Court has made a "sharp break" with old law. Id. at 984.
...The Court felt the constitutional question of whether
probable cause was necessary for searches at fixed check-
points should not have been reached by the circuit court as
the case could have been disposed of on the retroactivity
question alone. "The district courts and courts of appeals
should . . . , when issues of both retroactivity and applica-
tion of constitutional doctrine are raised . . . [decide] the
retroactivity issue first." 422 U.S. at 920.
2Id. at 919.
122422 U.S. at 554; 422 U.S. at 921. Justice Brennan
was joined by Justice Marshall. Justice Stewart joined only
part one of Justice Brennan's dissent in Peltier. He dis-
sented without opinion in Bowen. Justice Douglas dis-
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Brennan maintained that no issue of prospectivity
was involved in either Peltier or Bowen. He con-
tended that Almeida-Sanchez set no new rule, and
that the Court merely applied traditional fourth
amendment standards and construed section 287
accordingly. 123
He disputed the Court's conclusion that prior to
the Almeida-Sanchez decision the Border Patrol had
justifiably relied on section 287 for authority to
conduct immigration searches without probable
cause. That section, he maintained, only exempted
the Border Patrol from the warrant requirement. It
did not expressly dispense with the need for probable
cause. 124
Nor did Justice Brennan agree with the majority
that a long line of decisions in the circuit courts had
consistently approved immigration searches without
probable cause:
[T]he approval by courts of appeals of this law enforce-
ment practice was short-lived, less than unanimous,
irreconcilable with other rulings of the same courts,
and contrary to the explicit doctrine of this Court in
Carroll... and other cases. 125
The majority, he concluded, had simply abandoned
the essential requirement of a "sharp break" in the
law before a decision was to be granted prospective
application.
Failure to consider the "sharp break" test in
prospectivity questions resulted in a "travesty of
justice" 22 for the individual defendant who was not
given the benefit of long established constitutional
principles. In addition, Justice Brennan feared that
the Court's willingness to grant prospective applica-
tion to a rule which did not differ substantially from
previous standards would create an atmosphere in
which law enforcement officials would feel free to
"disregard the plain purport" 127 of the Court's
decisions and wait until a given procedure was
specifically held unconstitutional before altering their
conduct. 12
In part two of his dissent, Justice Brennan
sented with an opinion applicable to both Peltier and
Bowen. He maintained that a "constitutional rule made
retroactive in one case must be applied retroactively in
all." 422 U.S. at 543.
... Immigration and Nationality Act § 287, 8 U.S.C. §
1357 (1970).
124422 U.S. at 545.
125 Id. at 547.
1261d. at 549.
"
7Id. Justice Brennan was quoting from Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas, J., dis-
senting).
125422 U.S. at 549.
criticized the Court's "presumption" 129 of prospec-
tivity in cases involving the exclusionary rule. He felt
the Court had ignored the principle that decisions of
prospective application were to be made on a case by
case basis ... and created instead a class of cases in
which prospectivity is "the rule and not, as hereto-
fore, the exception." "'
In section three, the most significant part of his
dissent, Justice Brennan vigorously protested the
majority's "revision" 112 of the exclusionary rule.
Rather than an objective determination of whether
evidence was in 'fact seized unconstitutionally, the
Court, under the majority's conception of the exclu-
sionary rule, would have to inquire first into the
"subjective knowledge" "3I of the officer and the
inferences he should have drawn from the existing
law, and based on that inquiry then determine
whether suppression would "comport with either the
deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule or the
'imperative of judicial integrity.' " " Not only
would this approach change the essential character of
the rule as the Court had traditionally applied it, but
it would add a "new layer of factfinding" 13' to the
Court's consideration of motions to suppress and
focus the Court's attention unduly on the behavior of
the police instead of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. 126
Justice Brennan contended that the Court's refor-
mulation was based on the erroneous assumption
that the exclusionary rule was meant to deter
unlawful conduct by punishment of the individual
official involved in unconstitutional searches. The
exclusionary rule does not operate to deter by
punishment of individual officials, he maintained. Its
purpose is to deter by "removing an inducement to
violate fourth amendment rights." 131 With a strong
exclusionary rule, law enforcement officials have
little incentive to violate fourth amendment rights.
Without the rule, or with the majority's weakened
form of the rule, he felt the Court would actually
encourage officials to be stretching their interpreta-
tions of what constitutes proper conduct under the
fourth amendment and to be "opting invariably" 138
12 91d. at 550.
13 0Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).




1351d. at 560.13 6Id. at 561.
13 1Id. at 557. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 431-32
(1974).
138422 U.S. at 559.
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for the interpretation that gives them the most lati-
tude.
Although he admitted that the reformulation
applies only in the context of retroactivity cases as
yet, Justice Brennan noted that the Court had spoken
in general terms which he doubted would be limited
to retroactivity cases. He predicted that
when a suitable opportunity arises, today's revision of
the exclusionary rule will be pronounced applicable to
all search-and-seizure cases. 139
One troublesome aspect of the Peltier and Bowen
decisions is the Court's conclusion that the Border
Patrol relied on a consistent line of circuit court
decisions upholding its authority to search without
probable cause. Yet, as evidenced by the disagree-
ment among members of the Supreme Court itself, 140
as well as among members of the circuit courts, 141 the
border area search cases cannot easily be character-
ized as a long line of consistent decisions. In some
cases immigration searches were upheld as long as
they were within a reasonable distance of the
border; 542 in others, the courts required "adequate
grounds for a reasonable suspicion that illegal aliens
may be concealed within the vehicle"; 143 and, in still
other cases, unless the search could be characterized
as a "border search," 144 probable cause was the only
acceptable standard. 1 45 In addition, much of the
language seemingly supporting searches without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion comes from
dicta rather than the actual holdings of the cases. 146
Thus, although perhaps the "tenor" of the decisions
was that probable cause was not required for
immigration searches, a strong argument can be
made that the Border Patrol should not have relied
13
'1d. at 552.
145United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 545-47
(1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
275,285 (1973).
14'Bowen v. United States, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.
1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Peltier,
500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
"'Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th
Cir. 1969).
14'United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th
Cir. 1973).144The term "border search" refers to searches incident
to a border crossing, although the search itself may not
actually take place at the border. If there is reasonable
certainty that a car contained contraband or illegal aliens at
the time of entry, a search of the vehicle at some point
distant from the border can be characterized as a "border
search." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 452 F.2d 459,
463 (7th Cir. 1971) (Browning, J., dissenting), rev'd on
other grounds, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
'United States v. Klandis, 432 F.2d 132 (9th Cir.
1970).
146422 U.S. at 540; 500 F.2d at 988 n.3.
heavily on these circuit court decisions.
Particularly since the Supreme Court specifically
held in Carroll v. United States147 that automobile
searches without warrant must meet the standard of
probable cause to be constitutional, it is unfortunate
that the Court chose to sanction the Border Patrol's
reliance on ambiguous courts of appeals decisions.
However, Justice Brennan's assertion that the Court
abandoned the "sharp break" test may be overstating
the case since the "sharp break" element is at least
implicit in the Court's consideration of the reliance
question. The Court is not just concerned with the
fact of reliance, but with whether a retroactive
application of a new standard will adversely affect a
party who has relied on an earlier standard. If the
new standard is not significantly different than the
old it is unlikely that the problem of detrimental
reliance will arise. While there is considerable room
for disagreement with the Court's conclusion that the
Border Patrol justifiably relied on the circuit court
decisions, the fact that the Court stressed the issue of
reliance is some evidence that it felt the Almeida-
Sanchez decision did make a break with past
precedent. 141
The real basis for the decisions in Peltier and
Bowen might not have been the theoretical constructs
of reliance on, or sharp break with, past case law,
however. The Court simply may have been reluctant
to free either of these two admittedly guilty defend-
ants or other incarcerated prisoners whose convic-
tions would be overturned if Almeida-Sanchez were
given retroactive application. Some support for this
proposition is found in Justice Rehnquist's pointed
references to Peltier's confession of guilt after losing
on his motion to suppress. 4 9 The same sort of
14267 U.S. 132 (1925).
14
'There is somewhat more support for Justice Bren-
nan's contention that the Court has created a class of cases
in which prospectivity is the rule and not the exception.
422 U.S. at 550. The Court's interpretation of the Stovall
criteria seem to make prospectivity a foregone conclusion
inexclusionary rule cases, even if the decision is ostensibly
on a case by case basis.
'""When respondent's motion to suppress the evidence
was denied after a hearing, he stipulated in writing that he
'did knowingly and intentionally possess, with intent to
distribute, the marijuana concealed in the 1962 Chevrolet
which he was driving on February 28, 1973."' 422 U.S.
at 532. Justice Rehnquist also pointed out in a footnote
that this stipulation contained a proviso that it would not
have been entered into if the motion to suppress had been
granted. Id. at 532 n.1. He referred to the stipulation again
in support of this point that evidence seized illegally is
still reliable. "[The evidence] was sufficiently damning
on the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence that he
stipulated in writing that he was guilty of the offense
charged." Id. at 539.
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consideration may have entered the majority's deci-
sion in Bowen as well, for the Court in previous
decisions 5 ' has openly questioned the wisdom of
applying new constitutional standards retroactively
when the effect is to let the "criminal go free because
the constable has blundered." "'
Whatever subliminal reasons may have influenced
the Court to deny retroactivity in Peltier and Bowen,
the specific language of the Court in Peltier may
signal a change in the Court's approach to the
exclusionary rule. Heretofore, evidence was excluded
if the Court determined that it was in fact seized
unconstitutionally, regardless of what the officer
knew. 152 However, dissatisfaction with this practice
has grown significantly in the past few years. "'
Critics of the rule have stressed that society has a
strong interest in discovering the truth based on all
reliable evidence,"" and that there is no proof that
the possible exclusion of evidence has any deterrent
effect on police behavior. "' The language of the
Peltier decision seems to indicate that the Court
recognizes and agrees with these criticisms. Taken
literally, Justice Rehnquist's words imply that evi-
dence will not be excluded unless it can be shown
that the police clearly knew they were violating a
defendant's fourth amendment rights:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may be
properly charged with knowledge, that the search was
unconstitutional under the fourth amendment."'
This approach to the exclusionary rule assumes
that the individual officer cannot be deterred by what
"50 Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 685 (1973); Linklet-
ter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
"'.People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21,150 N.E. 585,587
(1926).
"'2422 U.S. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"'See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1970)
(Burger, C. J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 665
(1970).
15'Oaks, supra note 153, at 735.
"Id. at 672.
15422 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added).
he does not specifically know, and that the "impera-
tive ofjudicial integrity" will not be compromised by
the use of evidence that was seized unconstitutionally
as long as the policeman didn't know he was acting
improperly. However, it has been asserted that the
police are only secondarily concerned with conform-
ing their conduct to the constitutional standards set
forth by the Supreme Court, "' and, if necessary, will
even lie in order to make sure evidence they uncover
is admissible under the exclusionary rule."' Placing
emphasis on what the policeman knew may actually
encourage this practice.
Of course, what the officer "should have known"
is also part of the Court's "new test" for excluding
evidence. This will prevent the police from pleading
ignorance in situations of blatant violations of fourth
amendment standards. But, until the Court clearly
defines what criteria will be used to determine that
the police "may be properly charged with
knowledge" "' that their conduct was unconstitu-
tional, the test is of little value in less obvious search
and seizure cases. In the border area search cases, for
example, Justice Brennan pointed out that the
Border Patrol, a national organization, might easily
have been charged with knowledge that automobile
searches require probable cause to be constitutional
under the Supreme Court's decisions. "0 Yet, it could
also be argued that the Border Patrol could have
inferred from the circuit court decisions that immi-
gration searches were simply an exception to this
standard. Thus, the attitude of a particular court
toward the exclusionary rule may make a significant
difference under the Peltier approach to the rule. If
the majority is unhappy with the rule and wants to
avoid excluding evidence, it will be possible for the
court to limit extensively the application of the rule
by repeatedly finding that the police reasonably
inferred from existing law that their conduct was
constitutional. The fact that the Court in Peltier
spoke in general terms may indicate its intention to
use a "revised" exclusionary rule in just such a way.
'
1
J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 215 (1967).
"'Oaks, supra note 153, at 708, 739.
"-9422 U.S. at 542.
" Id. at 553 n.1. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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